Will Quantum Cryptography ever become a successful technology in the
  marketplace? by Lo, Hoi-Kwong
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
99
12
01
1v
1 
 2
 D
ec
 1
99
9
Will Quantum Cryptography ever become a successful technology in the marketplace?
Hoi-Kwong Lo
MagiQ Technologies Inc.
275 Seventh Avenue
26th Floor
New York, NY 10001
(September 19, 2018)
We assess the potential of quantum cryptography as a technology. We highlight the fact that
academia and real world have rather different perspectives and interests. Then, we describe the
various real life forces (different types of users, vendors of crypto-systems, conventional cryptogra-
phers, governments) behind the decision of the adoption (or rejection) of quantum cryptography and
their different interests. Various roadblocks to the widespread application of quantum cryptography
are discussed. Those roadblocks can be fundamental, technological, psychological, commercial or
political and many of them have nothing to do with the security of quantum key distribution. We
argue that the future success of quantum cryptography as a technology in the marketplace lies in
our ability to appreciate and to overcome those roadblocks and to answer real world criticisms on
the subject.
PACS Numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
In this quantum cryptography workshop∗ we have
heard many interesting talks. From an academic point
of view, it is quite clear that quantum cryptography is
a very active research area. Now, from the technological
point of view, it is natural to ask about the potential of
quantum cryptography as a technology. In other words,
will quantum cryptography ever be widely used in future?
Given the immense progress in both the theoretical
and experimental sides in the last few years, some of us
in the audience may be tempted to say ‘yes’. However,
ultimately the answer to this question does not depend
on the subjective opinions of research scientists, but on
the complex social and economic forces behind it as well
as future advancements in the quantum technology.
On the question of whether quantum cryptography will
ever be widely used in future, I certainly do not claim
to have a full answer. In this talk, I will simply share
with you some of my thoughts on the subject. None
of the viewpoints expressed here are original. Nor are
they sophisticated. They are just my personal simplifi-
cations and understandings/misunderstandings of what
is well known to people in other walks of life. However,
those viewpoints may not be commonly known to quan-
tum cryptographers. Being an industrial researcher with
a non-negligible amount of experience in research and
development of real-life conventional security systems, I
find it of value to introduce these viewpoints to other
quantum cryptographers. My hope is to stimulate fur-
∗This paper is an extended version of a talk to be presented
in NEC Princeton workshop on quantum cryptography, Dec.
13-15.
ther discussions on the subject. Your comments, correc-
tions and criticisms will be welcome.
II. ACADEMIA VS REAL WORLD
A. Technology focussed vs solution focussed
Let me begin by saying that the academic world
and the real world have very different perspectives. In
academia, we often deal with curiosity driven research.
Even in quantum technology, our main focus is technol-
ogy. That is to say the technological aspects of a subject.
For instance, in this workshop many talks deal with the
fundamental and technical issues of the security of quan-
tum cryptographic systems. Important as they are, those
subjects are so esoteric that they are quite beyond the
understanding of even the most sophisticated developers
and customers of conventional cryptography. More im-
portantly, those subjects do not necessarily address their
real world concerns.
In the real world, customers (users of cryptography)
generally have problems and they look for solutions, not
technology. It does not matter whether it is high-tech
or low-tech, so long as it can solve their problem, they
will take it. For instance, putting an eraser on top of
a pencil is a trivial idea from the technological point of
view. From the users’ point of view, this can be regarded
as a major invention that offers convenience and added
value to the individual eraser and the pencil. As another
example, nuclear power generators may be a high-tech
solution. But, it must compete with low-tech alternatives
like oil and coal in a competitive commodity market—
electricity generation.
Clearly, customer acceptance is very important to the
success of a technology in the marketplace. Beside cus-
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tomers, there are many other players in the develop-
ment/adoption of new technologies. Different players
have different interests and concerns, some of which may
be regarded as irrational by outsiders. Whether we like
it or not, the only way to assure that a technology is
adopted is to better understand the diverse interests and
concerns of different players in the field.
B. Players in the Quantum Game
Let me introduce the interested parties in the develop-
ment/adoption of cryptographic/security systems one by
one and describe their main concerns.
1. Academia
(A) Quantum Cryptographers Type I (Particu-
larly Theorists): The main interest of theoreticians in
quantum cryptography is to design cryptographic proto-
cols with perfect security [1].
(B) Quantum Cryptographers Type II (Partic-
ularly Experimentalists): The main interest of ex-
perimental quantum cryptographers is to design and im-
plement quantum cryptographic schemes that are feasi-
ble with current (or near future) technology and secure
against realistic attacks [2].
(C) Conventional Cryptographers? Some people
may argue that many conventional cryptographers live in
the same academic world as quantum cryptographers. I
have no comment on this argument.
2. Real World
(A) Users Type 1 (individuals): The main interest
of individual customers in using cryptographic/security
product is often the peace of mind. If the users voluntar-
ily use the product, this peace of mind may be due to the
preceived security offered by the product. If the users are
forced to use the products by others, the peace of mind
may arise because they make their employers happy.
Cost and transparency are two other major concerns
of the individual customer. Someone working on infor-
mation security once told me that the general feeling in
the community is that security does not sell. (i.e., While
customers worry about security, they are unwilling to pay
for a higher-price product for the sole reason of its being
more secure.) The acceptable additional cost of a more
secure product is essentially zero. People are interested
in a solution (say a payment scheme) that is offered as
a complete package: versatility, convenience of use, re-
liablility, cost and security. ”Security” is just a small
term in the whole equation. Here, I have put security
in a quotation mark because it is preceived security that
counts. A layman generally does not understand real se-
curity. Besides, it appears to me that there is no logical
consistence in users behaviors when many of them seem
perfectly happy in giving out their credit card numbers
over the phone, but not over the Internet.
Transparency of the operation of encryption is also a
plus. While a layman can intuitively appreciate the se-
curity offered by a an encrypted file which looks garbled
even to the unsophisticated eye, the same cannot be said
for quantum cryptography.
(B) Users Type II (businesses): A notable moti-
vation for many businesses such as the banking industry
to employ cryptographic products for its customers is
to limit its financial and legal liability. Businesses gen-
erally accept a certain degree of financial losses due to
insecure products as parts of their normal operating cost
in doing businesses. Therefore, non-perfect security of
conventional cryptographic systems is not a bad thing,
but a fact of life. The important things are to have risk
management and to have risk factors that are well under-
stood. Employing industrial standards is very useful in
reducing businesses’ financial and legal liability. Employ-
ing a non-standard disruptive technology like quantum
cryptography is much more risky.
Securing long distance communication is an impor-
tant concern in businesses. As international companies
are now getting more and more global and tremendous
amount of data are passed between different offices of
the same company or different companies, there is an in-
creasing need in securing those massive transcontinental
communications. Besides, there is an increasing need for
post-Cold-War type of applications like authentication
and signatures.
(C) Vendors of Crypto Products: Like any other
businesses, the main concern of vendors of crypto prod-
ucts is to make money in the long run. Besides, ven-
dors have vested interests in deciding which technology
to employ. For instance, a vendor with a large number of
patents and products in the elliptic curve crypto-systems
might be tempted to emphasize the strengths of elliptic
curve crypto products compared to products based on
other principles.
(D) Conventional Cryptographers and Security
Experts: Because of their own background and expe-
rience, conventional cryptographers and security experts
are keen to use something that they can understand and
trust such as the one-way function hypothesis. If you
ask them whether they believe in quantum mechanics or
one-way hypothesis more, their answer is clear.
(E) Governments: Different departments in a gov-
ernment have different interests. For instance, the mili-
tary and the foreign office are certainly interested in hav-
ing perfect security for their communications. On the
other hand, for agencies such as the FBI, the ability to
wiretap communications of the criminals is very impor-
tant. From this point of view, perfect security might
threaten national security and should be discouraged or
controlled by laws. I am not up to date with the current
US regulations. However, until recently, cryptography
has been regarded as ammunition in the US laws, sub-
ject to the strictest control in its usage and export.
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III. ROADBLOCKS
Having introduced the different players and their inter-
ests in cryptography, it is the time to discuss the major
roadblocks to the future deployment of quantum cryp-
tographic systems. For ease of discussion, I will divide
those roadblocks into different classes. However, my di-
vision is somewhat subjective.
A. Fundamental roadblocks
Quantum cryptography is a fundamentally limited
technology.
(A) Impossibility of unconditional security for
many applications
First, it has a limited range of applications. The funda-
mental appeal of quantum cryptography has been perfect
or unconditional security (i.e., security guaranteed by the
laws of quantum mechanics only and without making
any computational assumptions). However, the uncon-
ditional security of a number of important basic proto-
cols such as bit commitment [3], one-out-of-two oblivious
transfer [4] and one-way identification (and more gener-
ally, one-sided two-party secure computations) [4] have
been shown to be impossible in a series of no-go theo-
rems. What it means that all such protocols must require
quantum computational assumptions.
(B) Lack of public key based quantum crypto-
graphic schemes
Second, quantum cryptography has made no signifi-
cant contribution to public key cryptography. Many real
life cryptographic applications such as signature and au-
thentication schemes in the Internet age involve public
key cryptography. However, very little (if anything) has
been done on quantum cryptographic signature and au-
thentication schemes that are public-key based.
B. Technological roadblocks
(C) Limited distance in current quantum key
distribution experiments
Experimental quantum key distribution has been per-
formed over tens of kilometers. However, a major mar-
ket for secure communication is, in fact, transcontinental
communications. Until the distance achieved in experi-
mental quantum key distribution increases by two order
of magnitude, quantum key distribution is not a feasible
technology for this major market sector.
(D) Limited data rate
The current data rate for experimental quantum key
distribution is of the order kbits for second. (Worse still,
the post-processing including error correction and pri-
vacy amplification is quite massive.) In contrast, the
current world record for a single mode optical fiber com-
munication is 160 Gbits for second [5]. “Multiplying 160
gigabits over additional wavelengths, we expect to be able
to scale up to many trillions of bits a second in the fore-
seeable future.” says Alastair Glass, director of Bell Labs
Photonics Research Labs. If quantum key distribution is
ever going to be widely used for one-time pad application
for the massive data being transmitted in commercial op-
tical fibers, there is probably a ten order of magnitude
gap in data rate to be closed in the foreseeable future.
C. Commercial roadblocks
(E) Equipment size is too big.
Ideally, cryptographic applications should be done ei-
ther by a software or a very small hardware component
such as a smart card or a CD. Unfortunately, current
quantum cryptographic systems are quite big. Shrinking
a quantum cryptographic system to the size of a briefcase
is already a big challenge. Shrinking it to the size of a
smart card requires much ingenuity and development.
(F) Cost is too high.
The acceptable additional cost of a more secure cryp-
tographic product for individual consumers is essentially
zero while the components of existing quantum crypto-
graphic system cost hundreds or even thousands of dol-
lars.
(G) Integration with existing infrastructure in
information technology requires further develop-
ments.
Except for niche markets, we cannot expect an opti-
cal fiber to be solely dedicated to quantum communica-
tions for any substantial period of time. The integration
of quantum technology with conventional and existing
infrastructure in information technology requires much
further work.
D. Security roadblocks
(H) Known loopholes in current implementa-
tions
While quantum cryptography claims to offer perfect se-
curity in theory, in practice current experimental imple-
mentations contain quite a number of security loopholes.
It has been argued that essentially none of the existing
implementations is actually secure [2]. Plugging those
known loopholes is a highly non-trivial experimental and
theoretical design problem.
(I) Hidden loopholes in implementations
All security analyses of quantum cryptographic sys-
tems involve idealizations. It is highly probably that
many other fatal security loopholes in the implementa-
tions of quantum cryptography remain to be discovered.
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Given the slippery nature of the subject, quantum cryp-
tography hardly inspires the confidence of potential users.
The best way to construct a secure cryptographic sys-
tem is to try hard to break it. Unfortunately, until re-
cently very few people worked on breaking quantum cryp-
tographic systems. Without an army of people trying to
break them, the security of quantum cryptographic sys-
tems are largely untested.
E. Psychological/ Vested Interest roadblocks
(J) Conventional cryptographers have no confi-
dence in quantum mechanics.
Most conventional cryptographers do not understand
quantum mechanics. Nor are they familiar with its many
applications. In any case, the burden of proof of the use-
fulness of a new technology lies on its own practitioners,
not conventional cryptographers. In contrast, from their
point of view, things like the one-way function hypoth-
esis, the hardness of factoring are well-tested principles
and something that they understand well. It is wishful
thinking to ask them to take a leap of faith by abandon-
ing their well cherished philosophy and taking up a black
box philosophy for no apparent good reason.
Moreover, Neal Koblitz remarked in Crypto’ 97 (the
most important international conference in fundamental
research in cryptography) that many cryptographers hate
quantum computation because if it flies, it will put many
of them out of business. Indeed, if a quantum computer
is ever built, many public key cryptographic schemes that
are widely used today will be totally unsafe. This could
potentially kill public key cryptography and throw cryp-
tography back to the “dark age” [6]—a nightmare sce-
nario for electronic commerce and data security. [See,
however, [7] for a discussion of the possibility that public
key cryptographymay actually survive quantum attacks.]
Since quantum cryptography is a part of quantum infor-
mation processing, it is only natural that conventional
cryptographers may not like it neither.
(K) Vendors of conventional cryptographic
products have vested interests in promoting and
preserving conventional technologies.
If this is what conventional cryptographers might think
as individual researchers, you can imagine what existing
crypto-system vendors might think about quantum cryp-
tography: Quantum cryptography is far more likely to be
seen as an unwelcome threat rather than a potential op-
portunity.
In the history of technological developments, disrup-
tive technologies are often made possible by new firms
rather than existing firms that have large stakes in the
dominant existing technology.
F. Political/Legal roadblocks
(L) Quantum cryptography may be limited by
governmental crypto control policies.
As mentioned earlier, in the US, usage/export of strong
cryptography is subject to stringent governmental con-
trol. Any future usage/export of quantum cryptographic
systems will be subject to the same stringent set of regu-
lations. How to reconcile the main selling point of quan-
tum cryptography (strong security) and cryptography
control (limitation on the employment of strong cryptog-
raphy) is a subject that deserves future investigations.
IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Having discussed the various roadblocks to the future
widespread applications of quantum cryptography, I hope
that you will agree that the issue of commercial feasibil-
ity is much more complicated than a research scientist
may naively think. Certainly, my own grasp of the prob-
lem is limited. If there is a lesson in this talk, it is the
following: To better understand the issue of commercial
feasibility, it is best for quantum cryptographers to en-
gage more in constructive conversations with people in
the real world (users, vendors, conventional cryptogra-
phers, government officials, etc). While we do not have
to agree with what they say, it is important for us to
understand their views clearly. The future adoption of
quantum cryptography relies on their acceptance.
On the more technical side, I offer the following sub-
jective list of future directions.
1. Develop new applications for quantum cryp-
tography:
In my opinion, it is important to develop new appli-
cations of quantum cryptography such as signature and
authentication schemes, quantum voting, etc. Since var-
ious no-go theorems have ruled out the possibility of
a number of cryptographic primitives, future quantum
cryptographic systems may well be based on quantum
computational assumptions [8]. Therefore, it would be of
practical interest to invent a ”quantum one-way trapdoor
function”and public key based quantum cryptographic
systems.
One possible viewpoint to take is to regard quantum
cryptography as a natural extension (rather than a re-
placement) of conventional cryptrography and put its
foundation on computational assumptions on both con-
ventional cryptography and quantum mechanics. How
to combine the advantages offered by quantum mechanics
and public key infrastructure is a big issue. It would be of
particular interest to construct a public-key based quan-
tum encryption scheme and show rigorously that break-
ing it will require the simultaneous breaking of widely
accepted assumptions in both conventional cryptogra-
phy (such as cracking the Diffe-Hellman key exchange
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scheme) and quantum computation (such as the ability
to achieve quantum computation/measurement involv-
ing more than N qubits). Such an encryption scheme
will convince people in both conventional and quantum
cryptographic communities that it is secure against any
realistic attacks.
[Brassard [7] has emphasized the possibility that con-
ventional public key cryptography may actually survive
quantum attacks. According to [7], it has been argued in
[9] that quantum resistant one-way function that can be
computed efficiently with classical computers but cannot
be inverted efficiently even with a quantum computer
may well exist. That would be bad news for quantum
cryptographers, though.]
2. Use teleportation [10] to plug security loop-
holes [11]:
A major criticism on quantum cryptography is that
it may contain many hidden security loopholes. For in-
stance, while it is often assumed that a photon source
emits single photons, in real life perfect single photon
sources are notoriously hard to make. Besides, exper-
imental systems generally contain higher energy levels
whose occupancy is totally ignored in most security anal-
ysis. Indeed, as emphasized by, for example, John Smolin
[12], it is even conceivable in principle that an eavesdrop-
per can hide a quantum robot in the quantum signals
received by the two users. Owing to this quantum Tro-
jan Horse problem, quantum cryptographic systems seem
inherently unsafe.
Nonetheless, one can argue that by using teleportation,
quantum cryptographic systems can be made no more
unsafe than conventional ones [11]. One can reduce the
quantum Trojan Horse problem to a conventional Trojan
Horse problem. This is done by the following method. In-
stead of receiving any untrusted quantum signals from a
quantum channel, each user insists that any signal should
be teleported to him/her. For instance, Bob prepares
locally an EPR pair and sends a member to a labora-
tory outside his door. Any incoming quantum signal will
be teleported to him by his doorman outside his door.
What he receives are just classical messages. Note that
teleportation provides an exact counting of the number
of dimensions of Hilbert space of the reconstructed state.
This is so even if the original EPR pair that Bob prepares
is imperfect and contains hidden dimensions.
Of course, the problem of classical Trojan Horse attack
remains. But, this is inevitable. Since Bob’s goal is to
receive classical communications from Alice through an
untrusted channel, if receiving untrusted classical mes-
sages is a problem, the whole enterprise of secure com-
munication is simply hopeless.
3. Use quantum repeaters [13] to extend the
range of secure quantum key distribution.
This is crucial if quantum key distribution is ever to
make any impact on intercontinental communication.
4. Increase data rate for quantum key distribu-
tion.
Existing schemes for quantum key distribution such as
BB84 and Ekert’s scheme are based on two-level quantum
systems and as such their data rates are limited. If quan-
tum cryptography is ever widely used as one-time pad
for encrypting massive data in communications, higher
level systems and particularly continuous variable quan-
tum cryptography are a way to go forward. This would
mean that many of the current investigations may be-
come obsolete in the near future.
5. Miniaturization.
The ultimate goal is to reduce the size of quantum
cryptographic systems to that of a smart card or a com-
pact disc.
6. Integration with existing infrastructure in
information technology.
It may be hard to justify the cost of construction of an
entirely new infrastructure dedicated to the long-distance
transmission of quantum signals. Integration of quantum
technology with existing infrastructure (including optical
fibers) in information technology is, therefore, an impor-
tant subject.
7. Towards an international standard for quan-
tum cryptography.
Ultimately, some form of international standards will
be needed for the widespread deployment of quantum
cryptography.
8. We need quantum hackers.
We have seen encouraging signs that researchers are
finally taking a critical look at the security of current
experimental implementations of quantum cryptographic
systems [2]. In order to better understand the real risk
of employing quantum cryptography, much more should
be done on the subject.
An attacker should attack a Chinese Wall from its
weakest point. The weakest point of a cryptographic sys-
tem often lies in the blindspot of its designers. A cryp-
tographer may regard a cryptographic system as a math-
ematical black box function which provides an output for
each input. However, in real life the box is never black
to begin with. (Private keys embedded in a smart card
circuitry may be read out by illuminating the smart card
with various wavelengths of electromagnetic radiations.)
The black box also gives out timing information, power
consumption information, etc, etc. The inputs to the
black box include also its power supply, something that
is subject to manipulations by malicious parties. The
designer of the black box may try to cheat by designing
a black box that leaks information in a subtle encrypted
way that can be read by only the designer.
Indeed, in conventional cryptography, it is often the
case that the most powerful attacks against a system has
little to do with the fundamental design or mathemati-
cal equations underlying the design. The devil is in the
actual implementation, rather than the fundamental de-
sign. If we are really interested in the future of quantum
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technology, we must face up to those subtle loopholes in
implementations. A way to do so is to become a quan-
tum hacker and devise innovative methods of cracking
experimental quantum cryptographic system.
9. Crypto control of quantum cryptography?
The issue of cryptography control of quantm cryptog-
raphy remains to be addressed. I have no particular sug-
gestion.
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